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/* * Copyright 2021-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */
#include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <openssl/core_names.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/params.h> #include <openssl/err.h>
/* * Taken from NIST's GCM Test Vectors * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/ */
/* * Hard coding the key into an application is very bad. * It is done here solely for educational purposes. */ static unsigned char key[] = { 0x77, 0xbe, 0x63, 0x70, 0x89, 0x71, 0xc4, 0xe2, 0x40, 0xd1, 0xcb, 0x79, 0xe8, 0xd7, 0x7f, 0xeb };
/* * The initialisation vector (IV) is better not being hard coded too. * Repeating password/IV pairs compromises the integrity of GMAC. * The IV is not considered secret information and is safe to store with * an encrypted password. */ static unsigned char iv[] = { 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x0f, 0x19, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xba, 0x01, 0x36, 0xa7, 0x97, 0xf3 };
static unsigned char data[] = { 0x7a, 0x43, 0xec, 0x1d, 0x9c, 0x0a, 0x5a, 0x78, 0xa0, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x33, 0xa6, 0x21, 0x3c, 0xab };
static const unsigned char expected_output[] = { 0x20, 0x9f, 0xcc, 0x8d, 0x36, 0x75, 0xed, 0x93, 0x8e, 0x9c, 0x71, 0x66, 0x70, 0x9d, 0xd9, 0x46 };
/* * A property query used for selecting the GMAC implementation and the * underlying GCM mode cipher. */ static char *propq = NULL;
int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rv = EXIT_FAILURE; EVP_MAC *mac = NULL; EVP_MAC_CTX *mctx = NULL; unsigned char out[16]; OSSL_PARAM params[4], *p = params; OSSL_LIB_CTX *library_context = NULL; size_t out_len = 0;
library_context = OSSL_LIB_CTX_new(); if (library_context == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "OSSL_LIB_CTX_new() returned NULL\n"); goto end; }
/* Fetch the GMAC implementation */ mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(library_context, "GMAC", propq); if (mac == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "EVP_MAC_fetch() returned NULL\n"); goto end; }
/* Create a context for the GMAC operation */ mctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac); if (mctx == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "EVP_MAC_CTX_new() returned NULL\n"); goto end; }
/* GMAC requires a GCM mode cipher to be specified */ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CIPHER, "AES-128-GCM", 0);
/* * If a non-default property query is required when fetching the GCM mode * cipher, it needs to be specified too. */ if (propq != NULL) *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_PROPERTIES, propq, 0);
/* Set the initialisation vector (IV) */ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV, iv, sizeof(iv)); *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
/* Initialise the GMAC operation */ if (!EVP_MAC_init(mctx, key, sizeof(key), params)) { fprintf(stderr, "EVP_MAC_init() failed\n"); goto end; }
/* Make one or more calls to process the data to be authenticated */ if (!EVP_MAC_update(mctx, data, sizeof(data))) { fprintf(stderr, "EVP_MAC_update() failed\n"); goto end; }
/* Make one call to the final to get the MAC */ if (!EVP_MAC_final(mctx, out, &out_len, sizeof(out))) { fprintf(stderr, "EVP_MAC_final() failed\n"); goto end; }
printf("Generated MAC:\n"); BIO_dump_indent_fp(stdout, out, out_len, 2); putchar('\n');
if (out_len != sizeof(expected_output)) { fprintf(stderr, "Generated MAC has an unexpected length\n"); goto end; }
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(expected_output, out, sizeof(expected_output)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Generated MAC does not match expected value\n"); goto end; }
rv = EXIT_SUCCESS; end: EVP_MAC_CTX_free(mctx); EVP_MAC_free(mac); OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(library_context); if (rv != EXIT_SUCCESS) ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); return rv; }
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